Twelve years after the inception of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the US policy on the protection of foreign investment is evolving. This article compares the provisions on investment in the recent US free trade agreements (FTAs) and the 2004 model bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with NAFTA's. While most of the provisions are similar, some differences can be identified, both in substantive and procedural forms. We explain this evolution by a learning process of the US administration from the NAFTA experience. We argue that the new features of the FTAs and of the revised model BIT result from the US interest in reaching a better balance between the protection of investment and the protection of state sovereignty. This American concern stems from a reaction to the claims filed by foreign investors under NAFTA Chapter 11, at least some of which were perceived as 'frivolous' by the US government. However, the recent US FTAs and model BIT do not reveal a thorough policy reorientation but rather adjustments to the policy at the basis of NAFTA's investment chapter.
introduction
For decades, the US government has consistently promoted an international regulatory framework governing the treatment of foreign investment, insisting on strong protection for investors. One of its main achievements was the conclusion in 1994 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its Chapter 11 on investment.
1 This chapter was subsequently used as a model for 13 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) concluded by the United States with developing countries. Both NAFTA and the BITs concluded after 1994 prohibit discrimination, actions tantamount to expropriation, money transfer bans, performance requirements and violations of the minimum standard of treatment. To ensure compliance with these substantive obligations, they entitle investors of signatory nations to binding arbitration actions against a host government (investor-state provisions).
The collapse of the negotiations on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in 1998 and the lack of a firm commitment to negotiate an agreement on investment in the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have not lessened the US determination to promote an international regulatory framework on investment. Thus, the recently concluded free trade agreements (FTAs) with Singapore (SFTA), 2 Chile (CFTA), 3 Australia (AFTA), 4 the Central American countries, the Dominican Republic (CAFTA) 5 and Morocco (MFTA) 6 include rules on the treatment and protection of foreign investment.
However, thirteen years after the conclusion of the NAFTA, the US policy regarding international investment law is evolving. Indeed, the United States released, in February 2004, a revised version of the template it uses to negotiate BITs. 7 The first US BIT under the revised model was concluded with Uruguay in September 2004. 8 However, the recent US FTAs had already put into effect the provisions of this revised model BIT that differ from previous BITs and NAFTA. Yet, as we will see in this article, these new provisions are mainly safeguards to ensure that the protection of investors from states' egregious measures does not threaten the ability of governments to regulate in the public interest.
The turning point of this policy, if one has to be identified, appears to be the adoption by the US Congress in 2002 of the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), 9 which delineates US negotiating objectives on foreign investment. While Section 2101 of the TPA reaffirms that the United States should seek to 'reduce or eliminate artificial or trade-distorting barriers to foreign investment', it emphasizes that 'foreign investors [should not be] accorded greater substantive rights with respect to investment protections than United States investors in the United States', 10 a long-held criticism against investor-state provisions.
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The revised US policy is also concomitant with significant changes in world investment flows. According to the US Department of Commerce, the value of foreign investments in the United States exceeded the value of US investments abroad by the unprecedented peak of US$2,430 billion in 2003. 12 One would expect that being a net importer of capital, the US government would be more concerned about foreign investors' claims against the United States than with the protection of US investments abroad. However, the increase of inward flows is mainly due to large net foreign purchases of US securities such as corporate bonds and treasury securities, less likely to be the subject of an investor claim than foreign direct investment (FDI). In addition, the US FDI outflows rose by 15% in 2002, while the European and Japanese FDI outflows decreased by 13 and 18%, respectively. 13 Therefore, even if the investment inflows to the United States have increased during the last couple of years, the protection of US FDI abroad is becoming increasingly relevant.
While the political context and economical factors have to be considered, this article explains the revised US policy in the light of the NAFTA investorstate cases against the American government. The changes must be seen as the result of a learning process from the US administration, rather than the consequences of new political powers or economic interests. It is as a reaction to claims filed by foreign investors under NAFTA Chapter 11, several of these perceived as 'frivolous' by the American government, that the new features of the recent US FTAs and the revised model BIT aim to reach a better balance between the protection of investment and the protection of state sovereignty. Nevertheless, we can argue that the recent FTAs and the 2004 model BIT do not reveal a thorough policy reorientation but rather adjustments to the policy at the basis of NAFTA Chapter 11.
This article is organized as follows. The next section reviews the cases raised against the US government to identify their common grounds and tendencies. In the light of the claims and rulings made under the NAFTA's investment regime, the second section outlines the differences between the substantive investment provisions in NAFTA and in the recent FTAs and the 2004 model BIT. The third section discusses how the procedural provisions on investor-state dispute settlement included in the recent US FTAs and the 10 Ibid.
11 Yet, can this TPA objective of not giving more rights to foreigners than to US investors really be achieved? To the extent that an investor-state dispute mechanism provides an extra layer of protection to foreign investors that Americans cannot claim, it automatically gives more rights to foreigners, irrespective of how the substantive treaty rights are phrased. model BIT aim to prevent frivolous claims. This will lead to concluding remarks on the American policy on investment protection.
i. learning from the nafta experience
Before analyzing the substantive and procedural provisions of the recent FTAs and the 2004 model BIT, we need to consider the litigation history that motivates the evolution of these provisions. The implementation of the NAFTA's chapter on investment, and particularly tribunals' awards, has been anticipated to bring about a body of case law 14 to supplement and give more precise meaning to the scope and application of the substantive obligations of Chapter 11. Yet, as soon as they began to be implemented, towards the late 1990s, these provisions raised controversy and were perceived to be implemented in ways not envisioned by the parties, namely to protect US and Canadian investments from a historically unpredictable Mexican regulatory environment. 15 Most of the criticism, thus far, has centred on 'frivolous' claims that threaten the ability of governments to regulate in the public interest and that confer more rights on foreign, as against national, investors.
A. NAFTA investor-state cases involving the United States: key features and trends
There have been 41 notices of intent filed under Chapter 11 from the implementation of NAFTA in January 1994 to February 2006. Canada has been subject to 12, Mexico to 15 and the United States to 14. 16 As many authors already provide instructive summaries of these cases, 17 we will not consider each of them in detail. Instead, we will try to identify their common grounds and tendencies that are relevant to consider as we study new trends in the recent US FTAs and model BIT. For that purpose, we will pay particular attention to the NAFTA investor-state cases filed against the United States (Table 1) The first surprising feature of NAFTA cases is that many of them are brought against nations with well-developed legal systems. At the beginning, BITs were signed to provide 'protection from harmful state interference in countries that otherwise have weak or corrupt judicial systems'. 18 For a long time, developing countries were the typical respondent host states, while the United States was often the origin country of the investor claimants. Even if the United States was one of the first states to ratify the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention in 1966, the first ICSID case filed against the United States, Loewen, 19 occurred only in October 1998. But the wind of litigation has changed. Since 1994, the three NAFTA member states have received approximately the same number of notices of intent. Therefore, the United States has come to see itself not only as a capital exporter but also as a host state exposed to foreign investors' claims. What was meant to be a shield to protect US investors has turned into a sword against the US government. 20 As Noah Rubins puts it, the United States 'found [itself] bound to obey principles of international law [it] had developed to control the conduct of others'. 21 The US anxiety at being the subject of claims has been amplified by the growing number of cases. While ICSID had registered only 21 arbitration cases during its first twenty years, it had registered 123 cases by June 2005, 22 including 26 cases during the single year of 2003. 23 At the NAFTA level, while only one claim was filed against the United States between January 1994 and January 1999, the US government was, in February 2006, the defending party in five simultaneous cases, disregarding those for which only a notice of intent has been filed.
Even if some NAFTA claims filed against the United States during the last couple of years are due to particular circumstances, namely the Softwood Lumber and CCFT disputes, there is undoubtedly an underlying trend to litigate. The growing foreign investment stock among NAFTA countries 24 and the successful attempt by some investors to obtain compensation undoubtedly contribute to the rise in litigation. Interestingly, of the three completed investor-state cases adjudicated under NAFTA in which the United States was involved, no arbitral award found in favour of the investors. 25 All claims against the United States were, in fact, dismissed and no compensation has thus far been awarded. 26 But these two factors, the investment flows and the psychological effect of favourable rulings on investors' strategies, are difficult to foresee. Thus, the amplitude of the litigation trend is difficult to evaluate in the long term.
However, the home country of the claimants seems quite foreseeable. In fact, all of the NAFTA cases against the United States were filed by Canadian investors! This trend is not surprising because the value of Canadian FDI in the United States is 10 times higher than the Mexican. 27 In other words, the 
B. Some key cases and issues and the 2001 interpretation
In the Methanex case, for instance, the measure was a ban on the use of a gasoline additive for an environmental purpose that did not explicitly target a specific investor. Methanex claimed, on the contrary, that the ban unfairly targets a specific product, methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE), made from methanol, of which the Canadian firm is the world's largest manufacturer, while not acting vis-à-vis other like harmful products, such as ethanol, produced by US competitors. 39 However, Methanex's claims were completely dismissed in August 2005. The arbitral award set a tough standard for a finding of 'regulatory taking' or of a 'measure tantamount to expropriation', largely in line with US jurisprudence on takings.
40 Nonetheless, given the broad scope of international investment rules, it might still be quite difficult to predict if a measure could lead to a claim when a public authority enacts it. Should it be pursued, the CCFT case, in particular, involving a significant segment of the Canadian beef industry, would be telling of the reach of NAFTA investment provisions and their consequences for US regulatory authorities.
Many commentators and analysts have strong feelings about investors' claims, often taking an overt pro-government [e.g. public authorities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)] or pro-investor stance (e.g. business associations and corporate lawyers). In fact, there is an uneasy balance to find between regulatory and investment interests, as abuse is possible from both sides. If, for the United States and its NAFTA partners, there has been abuse of the NAFTA investment provisions on the part of foreign investors, at the same time, it has been recognized that at least some of the NAFTA claims had substantive merits. Governments are also well versed in disguising improper action as 'legitimate' regulation in the public interest. The Loewen award, in particular, recognizes the substantive merit of the claim despite dismissing it on technical grounds. 41 If virtually any kind of measure might affect foreign investment, any type of public authority can also take such a measure. Even if the defending party is always the central government, the alleged breaches of an obligation could result from a measure taken by the legislative, executive or judicial branches at the federal, state or municipal levels. In the Loewen case, the measure involved was the conduct and the verdict of a Mississippi State Court, and in the Grand River case, it is an agreement between various state attorney generals and the major tobacco companies. The inability of the US government to anticipate claims is thus worsened by the diversity of entities whose actions might affect foreign investment. Even more so if one considers that most local authorities are not the best informed, a priori, on the intricacies of international investment law.
Investor-state procedures are not only recurrent and unforeseeable, they can also be costly. Investors' claims against the United States have ranged from US$20 million to US$1 billion. So far, no Chapter 11 tribunal has ruled a final award against the United States, but this might change shortly as five cases, Loewen, Softwood Lumber, Glamis Gold, Grand River and CCFT, are still under adjudication. On the other hand, NAFTA cases have shown that there is a substantial difference between the amounts claimed and the amounts ultimately awarded. In S.D. Myers, the claim was US$20 million, and the award was set at US$3.87 million. 42 Nevertheless, these amounts, increased by legal fees, could be significant enough to make public authorities worry. Even more so if one considers that an award against a state party, even for a minor amount, could have heavy political cost.
To avoid an unmanageable number of claims and a potential 'regulatory freeze', the US government has systematically challenged the admissibility of claims and the competence of tribunals. Yet this could only be a shortterm strategy, because the NAFTA tribunals established under Chapter 11 are not officially bound by previous awards. Therefore, some US agencies, such as the Justice Department and the Environmental Protection Agency, called for sustainable safeguards on the investor-state arbitration process. 43 One might add that, for the United States, the NAFTA was negotiated by the Office of the United States Trade Representative, while the defence of NAFTA investor-state cases has been under the responsibility of the State Department. 41 Having learned from the NAFTA experience, the US government has concluded FTAs that, as we will see in the next sections, provide, from the start, substantive and procedural safeguards for US authorities.
ii. substantive provisions 
A. Definition of investment
US BITs have tended to adopt a broad, descriptive approach to the scope of covered investment and generally provide an extremely general statement of coverage. Under the 1994 US model BIT, the notion of investment is described as 'every kind of investment owned or controlled directly or indirectly', followed by a non-exhaustive list of asset categories falling within the definition of 'investment'. Typical categories in US investment treaties 44 include real estate and other direct property rights, shareholdings and other forms of participation in local companies, claims to payment or performance, intellectual property and other intangibles, and concession agreements. 46 The NAFTA treaty provides a somewhat different approach to defining investment, setting forth a broad but exhaustive list of covered economic activities. Investments under the NAFTA include FDI (an enterprise), portfolio investment (equity securities), partnership and other interests giving the owner a right to share in profits or liquidated assets, and tangible and intangible property 'acquired in the expectation ... of economic benefit'. Loan financing, meanwhile, is only protected when funds flow within a business group, or when debt is issued on a relatively long-term basis. Contract rights not falling under other categories of investment are covered only if they involve a 'commitment of capital or other resources in the territory of a party ... to economic activity in such territory'. NAFTA complements its exhaustive list of investment categories with a negative definition, establishing certain kinds of property not to be considered investments, such as money claims arising solely from commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services.
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The recent US FTAs represent a departure from the definitions of investment found in the NAFTA and the 1994 US model BIT. The recent US FTAs and the 2004 model BIT define investment broadly, as every asset owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by an investor, which has 'the characteristics of an investment', and include a non-exhaustive list of 'forms' such investments may take. Besides the typical 'core' investment types, such as enterprises, shares, intellectual property rights and moveable or immovable property, the recent US FTAs and the 2004 model BIT also cover various debt instruments, 'futures, options and other derivatives' and 'turnkey, construction, management, production, concession, revenue sharing and other similar contracts'. The recent US FTAs and the 2004 model BIT also innovate in that they include explanatory notes, designed to clarify and narrow the seemingly boundless definition. Hence, the 'characteristics of an investment' include 'the commitment of capital, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk', while in case of debt instruments, these would normally have to be long term. nevertheless provide guidance to arbitrators, directing them to look beyond the 'form' in favour of the economic essence of investment. In this regard, they seem to be both less restrictive than NAFTA's exhaustive definition of investment and more restrictive through their definition of investment in economic terms. Some tribunals adopted a broad interpretation of Article 1105 in addressing these two issues. In the Pope & Talbot case, the tribunal determined that fair and equitable protection was distinct from minimum treatment, leading to additional requirements. 51 In the S.D. Myers case, the tribunal ruled that a violation of the national treatment meant a violation of the minimum treatment. 52 As for Metalclad, the tribunal found that the minimum standard of treatment was not limited to customary international law.
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Following these decisions of the tribunals, in July 2001, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission adopted Notes of Interpretation that clarify the obligations under Article 1105 by providing a narrow interpretation. The Notes limit the meaning of international law to 'customary' minimum standard, thereby preventing recourse to other sources of international law, such as WTO agreements, that could have imposed higher obligations for host states on the treatment of foreign investors. 54 The notions of 'fair and equitable treatment' and 'full protection and security' do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by customary international law. The provision on minimum standard of treatment in the recent US FTAs reads: 'Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security' (emphasis added). 'Fair and equitable treatment' and 'full protection and security' are part of customary international law (as against international law in general as under NAFTA) and do not entail additional obligations. Examples of obligations derived from the minimum treatment standard are given, such as access to justice and police protection. Repeating the NAFTA's Notes of Interpretation, it is stipulated that a breach of another provision or of another agreement is not sufficient to find a violation of minimum treatment. 56 The article shall be interpreted in accordance with an annex that stipulates that the Parties confirm their shared understanding that 'customary international law' [...] results from a general and consistent practice of states that they follow from a sense of legal obligation. With regard to [the article on the minimum standard of treatment] the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens refers to all customary international law principles that protect the economic rights and interests of aliens. In the recent US FTAs and the 2004 model BIT, the article pertaining to expropriation reads: 'Neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization'. 59 The article shall be interpreted in the light of two annexes, a first on customary international law, mentioned before, and a second on expropriation. The latter specifies that the article on expropriation is intended to reflect customary international law and that an action cannot constitute an expropriation unless it interferes with a property right or a property interest. The determination of an indirect expropriation must consider, inter alia, (i) the economic impact of a government action (which, standing alone, does not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred); (ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and (iii) the character of the government action. Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions designed and applied to protect public health, safety and the environment do not constitute indirect expropriations. 60 These criteria for the consideration of indirect expropriation reflect US case law, as required under the TPA.
Interestingly, these changes introduced by the United States inspired other countries. The three American criteria that must be used to consider an expropriation, namely the economic impact, the interference with expectations and the character of the government action, are reproduced in the new Canadian model BIT adopted in 2003. 61 Thus, in its future BIT negotiations, the Canadian government will paradoxically promote criteria unknown in the global investment regime. It also shows that countries beyond the NAFTA boundaries draw lessons from the NAFTA experience. The main US business associations have themselves recognized, in the light of the NAFTA cases, the need to more effectively protect US regulatory interests. Yet they have opposed changing the substantive investment protection standards, which, they argue, would weaken investor protection. Rather, they have insisted on procedural safeguard mechanisms, such as a filtering mechanism for frivolous claims and a review mechanism to address errant awards. 63 iii. procedural provisions Three features stand out when we consider the procedural provisions in the recent US FTAs: the absence of a direct investor-state mechanism in the Australian FTA, the improvement of investor-state procedures in other FTAs and the creation of new mechanisms for labour and environmental law enforcement.
A. The lack of a direct investor-state mechanism in the Australian FTA
At first sight, the absence of direct investor-state arbitration in the US-Australia FTA is perplexing. Although the 1989 US-Canada FTA, 64 the forerunner of NAFTA, did not include an investor-state dispute mechanism, at least since NAFTA's inception, the United States and Australia had both consistently included such a mechanism in their respective FTAs. Instead, Article 11.16 of the US-Australia FTA provides that the parties can enter into consultations with a view towards allowing an investor of a party to submit a dispute to arbitration. Therefore, if an investor and the host country have not anticipated by a contract to settle disputes in an international arbitration tribunal, the investor who distrusts national courts must rely upon his home country to enter into consultations with the host country.
During the negotiations, Australia consistently rejected US demands for an investor-state mechanism, arguing that it has a functioning legal system capable of handling private-sector claims. However, the absence of investor-state provisions cannot only be attributed to Australia's stance, as US authorities apparently conceded to Australia's position without much resistance. 65 This return to a 'politicized' state-state mechanism is in some way a revision of the US fight against the Calvo doctrine. Until recently, the United States seemed entirely opposed to this doctrine which states essentially that aliens 'are not entitled to "extra" rights and privileges and thus may only seek redress in local courts'. 66 The withdrawal of direct investor-state procedures has not been a general policy for all subsequent US FTAs and BITs. Actually, ten days after the United States had signed the Australian FTA, it signed an FTA with the Central American countries that includes direct procedures for investor-state dispute settlement. Therefore, the absence of direct investor-state procedures seems acceptable to the United States only for FTAs with developed countries or, more precisely, with countries that have a legal system developed enough to comfort US investors. 68 Besides, countries with a developed legal system are also major capital exporters to the United States and may represent a threat of 'over-litigation'. The fact that all Chapter 11 claims against the United States come from Canadian investors is probably not irrelevant to the fact that the United States considers that an investor-state mechanism is not necessary with Australia. The NAFTA experience seems to have convinced the US Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee (IGPAC) members that opposing the Calvo doctrine should not be a universal rule:
IGPAC members' objection to the investor-state provision [in the USAustralia FTA] stems from concerns that investors from nations with welldeveloped legal systems have abused such FTA provisions to challenge the authority of state and local governments. The Methanex and Loewen cases [under NAFTA] in particular have reinforced concerns that the provision will be abused by investors who simply hope to circumvent established legislative and judicial procedures.
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The focus on developing countries for investor-state procedures is consistent with previous BITs and FTAs. Indeed, all US BITs and FTAs concluded after NAFTA were systematically directed at developing countries. The Australian FTA is the first within a decade, that is, since NAFTA's inception, to be concluded with a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 67 Above n 43, at 485-88. 68 In the FTA with Bahrain, there is no investor-state mechanism and, more importantly, no chapter on investment. Yet, in this case, a BIT concluded in 1999 and effective since 2001 is to take care of investment issues. This is in line with US policy's insistence on strong investor protection, including direct arbitration, in FTAs with developing countries. Development (OECD). Thus, it is the first time the United States clearly indicates that it does not consider investor-state procedures an essential component of investment agreements, when signed with a major capital-exporting country. However, it represents a departure from the strategy underlying the MAI negotiations. The MAI was supposed to be concluded among OECD countries, and many anticipated it would have been open to other countries once concluded. 70 But this strategy of concluding a multilateral agreement or a North-North agreement to be used as a model for subsequent multilateral agreements seems to be pushed aside. Seven years after the failure of the MAI, the United States is now reluctant to negotiate a MAI at the WTO, or even a plurilateral agreement among interested countries, as the European Union has suggested. 71 Some argue that the United States lacks enthusiasm for a WTO agreement on investment, because it remains highly pessimistic about the outcomes. 72 Moreover, with the Australian FTA, the United States seems to be moving away from an overall approach on investment protection to a differentiated strategy with respect to industrial countries.
This policy oriented on developing countries is not coherent with US outward investment flows. Even if developing countries may represent destinations more hazardous for US investment, protection of investment in developed countries is still relevant considering that they host over 80% of US FDI outflows. 73 US outward investment flows towards Australia are more than 10 times higher than towards CAFTA countries. 74 The Industry Sector Advisory Committee on Capital Goods thus expressed 'extreme [disappointment] and concern that the [US-Australia FTA] omits the principal protection for US investors that has been included in the other FTA investment chapter(s)'. 75 US-Australia FTA. In the Maffezini case, the arbitrators concluded 'that if a third-party treaty contains provisions for the settlement of disputes that are more favourable to the protection of the investor's rights and interests than those in the basic treaty, such provisions may be extended to the beneficiary of the most favoured nation clause'. 76 Because both Australia and the United States have concluded third-party treaties providing for direct investor-state procedures, one could argue that the MFN clause of the US-Australia FTA could be used by a firm to file a case against one of the state parties.
However, such a contention seems doubtful for three reasons. Firstly, unlike a number of BITs and FTAs, Article 11.4 of the US-Australia FTA provides expressly that the MFN is limited to the 'establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of investments'. This would seem to exclude dispute settlement, although the 'management' of an investment could probably include dispute procedures to protect it. Secondly, the fact that the lack of investor-state dispute settlement procedures is unusual for both states could mean that it is a conscious and well-informed move guided by public policy considerations. As the arbitrators ruled in Maffezini, 'The beneficiary of the [MFN] clause should not be able to override public policy considerations that the contracting parties might have envisaged as fundamental conditions for their acceptance of the agreement in question'. 77 Thirdly, recent tribunal awards suggest that the MFN provisions of a treaty can be extended to other treaties only when it is clearly intended.
78 Therefore, Canada might remain the only developed country (if we exclude European economies in transition) against which American investors could directly file a claim under an investment treaty.
B. Improved investor-state procedures with developing countries
Unlike the US-Australia FTA, the FTAs recently concluded by the United States with Singapore, Chile, the Central American countries and Morocco include an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. Procedures provided in these FTAs are similar to NAFTA's but differ on three significant points, that is, the adding of preliminary procedures, the improvement of transparency and openness and the anticipation of an appellate body.
First, the recent US FTAs and the revised model BIT provide preliminary procedures as a means to deter the filing of frivolous claims and, ultimately, curb the growing number of claims. To reach this goal, the US government could otherwise have required the exhaustion of local remedies as a precondition for resorting to arbitration as the Justice Department had considered. 79 But it probably experienced the value of preliminary procedures when systematically challenging the claims' admissibility and the tribunals' competence under NAFTA.
Thus, while NAFTA leaves preliminary procedures, or the jurisdictional test, to UNCITRAL or ICSID rules, the recent FTAs and the model BIT provide that 'a tribunal shall address and decide as a preliminary question any objection by the respondent that, as a matter of law, a claim submitted is not a claim for which an award in favour of the claimant may be made'. In doing so, the tribunal shall suspend any proceedings and issue an award on an expedited basis 'no later than 150 days after the date of the request'. If the tribunal considers that the claim is frivolous, it may award costs and fees to the prevailing claimant.
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In addition, the FTAs provide new grounds to disallow the admissibility of a claim in preliminary procedure. Actually, they include safeguard clauses on different sectors or circumstances that can justify the inadmissibility of a claim, such as treatment in case of strife, measures regarding payments and transfers and a dispute already submitted to a national court. 81 Therefore, the screening mechanism, coupled with the threat to pay costs and attorney's fees and the addition of new grounds for inadmissibility, may 'discourage investors from filing claims merely to strong-arm the government'. 82 Aside from preliminary procedures, the recent FTAs formalize the arbitral proceedings' transparency and openness. Following the arbitration rules of the ICSID Additional Facility and UNCITRAL, the proceedings may only be made public with the consent of both parties to a dispute. Hence, the opening of proceedings in NAFTA is provided by none of the arbitration rules and has been addressed by each tribunal on an ad hoc basis. This lack of transparency, although reflecting the traditional practice of international private law, has been criticized by many civil society groups that underline the important issues of public policy raised by the disputes. 83 In response to these criticisms, the main documents were to be made available to the public following the NAFTA's Notes of Interpretation of 31 July 2001. 84 In addition, Canada and the United States issued statements two years later to indicate that they will push for public hearings in all Chapter 11 cases in which they are involved.
The recent US FTAs and model BIT integrate these elements by requiring that the main documents of the proceedings be released to the public and that hearings be open to the public except to prevent the disclosure of certain investors' confidential information. 86 Consequently, these FTAs will provide the most transparent and publicly accessible of all investment arbitration proceedings.
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Under the recent FTAs, non-disputant parties may also intervene in the proceedings. The NAFTA and applicable arbitration rules are silent as to the participation of amici curiae. Nevertheless, NAFTA tribunals in the Methanex and UPS cases declared they had the power to accept amicus briefs based on UNCITRAL rules. 88 Following these awards, the recent FTAs and the model BIT unambiguously provide that a tribunal shall have the authority to accept and consider amicus submissions. 89 Considering that most amici curiae will most likely be submitted by environmental and other such advocacy groups, investors had a defensive reaction. 90 They even asked for a return to the NAFTA model as it was before the 2001 Notes of Interpretation were adopted. 91 The main impact of the transparency and openness of arbitral proceedings will probably not be on tribunals' awards, but on public perceptions regarding the legitimacy of the investor-state mechanism.
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The last major procedural feature of the recent FTAs is the anticipation of an appellate body. The ICSID and UNCITRAL arbitration rules 93 provide for reviews on certain procedural grounds, such as corruption on the part of a tribunal member or excess of jurisdiction. Under the ICSID Convention, an application to annul an award is referred to an ad hoc three-member committee. Awards made pursuant to the ICSID Additional Facility and UNCI-TRAL rules are in general subject to the control of the courts at the place of arbitration. Here the law authorizes the courts to set aside arbitral awards on 86 the grounds of non-arbitrability of the dispute or conflict with public policy, as well as on similar grounds as the ICSID Convention. 94 But these procedures are not a true appeal mechanism that can challenge previous decisions as regards their substance and that can substitute for them its own decisions. 95 On 13 January 2004, the Federal Court of Canada ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to challenge the arbitration tribunal's interpretation of NAFTA's Articles 1102 and 1105 in the S.D. Myers case: 'A dispute falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, even if wrongly decided on a point of fact or law, cannot be judicially reviewed'. 96 However, such procedures can still make a difference. In Loewen, the US District Court for the District of Columbia may have struck the final blow to Loewen's claims. 97 In Metalclad, the Supreme Court of British Columbia reduced the amount of the arbitral award. 98 The TPA calls 'for an appellate body or similar mechanism to provide coherence to the interpretations of investment provisions in trade agreements'. 99 The recent US FTAs have not completely reached this objective but provide that if a separate multilateral agreement establishes an appellate body, 'the Parties shall strive to reach an agreement that would have such appellate body review awards rendered'. 100 It is still unclear when and how the United States could promote a multilateral agreement on an appellate body because it is sceptical of the possibility of a multilateral or plurilateral agreement on investment at the WTO. 101 Moreover, in their comments in 2005 to the suggestion from the ICSID Secretariat to establish an appeals facility, most governments, business and civil society groups considered the establishment of such a mechanism to be premature. 102 On the other hand, the United States refused to delay the negotiations of FTAs and BITs until a bilateral appellate body could be developed. Therefore, side letters or annexes to the FTAs provide that the parties should negotiate a bilateral appellate body in the years following their entry into force. 103 But until then, the FTAs' to factual records that, being publicly available, could put political, rather than judicial, pressure on governments. This process can paradoxically be used by investors who seek to bolster their claim against a host state. In 1999, Methanex filed a petition under the NAAEC alleging that California failed to enforce its environmental laws by allowing gasoline to be released into the environment from leaking underground storage tanks. 114 Methanex's objective was then to use the factual record issued by the CEC in its dispute under Chapter 11 over a Californian ban on the MTBE gasoline component. The factual record could have supported Methanex in demonstrating that California focuses its attention on a specific and discriminatory symptom, the MTBE, rather than on the real environmental problem, the leakage itself. Although the CEC refused to conduct an investigation on Methanex's petition because the matter was the subject of a pending judicial proceeding, 115 a subsequent investor could strategically file a petition under NAAEC before filing a claim under Chapter 11.
All the recent US FTAs devote whole chapters to labour and environmental issues. Among other things, these chapters provide that 'A Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its [labour and] environmental laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the Parties'. 116 If a party fails to enforce its labour or environmental laws, the other party may request the establishment of an arbitration panel to consider the matter. In contrast with other infringements of the provisions of the FTAs, a panel that finds a breach of the obligation to enforce labour or environmental laws can, at the complaining party's request, impose an annual monetary assessment, up to US$15 million per year, payable into a bilateral fund for labour or environmental initiatives. 117 As the Trade and Environment Policy Advisory Committee noted, 'the high level of visibility and resultant embarrassment associated with such a violation, in conjunction with the transparency of the process, would likely be a sizeable "supplement" to the monetary penalty'. 118 lower. But the FTAs' chapters on labour and the environment could have negative side effects on US investment abroad, such as the enforcement of foreign labour and environmental laws harmful to US investment and even laws that contradict the investment chapter.
The recent FTAs provide that in the event of inconsistency between, on the one hand, the investment chapter and, on the other hand, the labour and environment chapters, the latter shall prevail. 119 However, this does not necessarily mean that 'any bona fide [labour or] environmental requirement at odds with an investment-related requirement will trump that latter requirement'. 120 It is still unclear when an inconsistency between the two chapters can occur because a state can be forced under the labour and environment chapters to enforce a law discriminating against foreign investments and, at the same time, be forced under the investment chapter to offer monetary damages to foreign investors. Such an ironic situation is conceivable because investor-state arbitration tribunals cannot award the withdrawal or the non-enforcement of a national law but only monetary damages or eventually restitution of property. 121 At least, the FTAs' labour and environmental law enforcement mechanism will impact on out-of-court negotiations between an investor and a host state, because the non-enforcement of a labour and environmental law is no longer an option to consider without any risk of an international dispute under the relevant chapters. This is one of the main differences between the recent US FTAs and the 2004 model BIT, which does not provide for any dispute settlement mechanism on environment and labour.
conclusion
Many commentators are doubtful that the NAFTA Chapter 11 on investment could be replicated in other international agreements. 122 If one may conclude to a reorientation that contradicts some long-held key tenets of US foreign investment strategy, especially ever stronger protection for US investors, it has been limited to mere adjustments. The TPA intends that the pursuit of strong investment protection and investor-state dispute settlement be continued in future FTAs. Even though a central element of US international investment strategy has been questioned, namely the automatic right for investors to binding international arbitration, as particularly illustrated by the absence of investor-state provisions in the US-Australia FTA, this remains an isolated example.
While preserving the fundamentals of US investment protection, changes to investor-state provisions in the recent FTAs seemed necessary to address the issues raised by the NAFTA cases. Above all, such changes are intended to lessen the possibilities of a replication of the claims under NAFTA where the investor-state provisions have been perceived by NAFTA members as being abused by foreign investors. Most substantive and procedural clarifications and safeguards, such as those on the characteristics of an investment, the scope of the minimum treatment provision, the meaning of the expression 'measure equivalent to expropriation', the publication of proceedings' documents and the possibility to submit amicus curiae briefs, integrate lessons from the implementation of the NAFTA's investment chapter, including elements of some previous NAFTA tribunal awards or the NAFTA Commission's Notes of Interpretation.
The revised American policy has sought essentially to better reconcile the objectives of strong investor protection with the possibility for governments to enact regulations without fear of compensatory claims. In so doing, the evolving US policy has focused on clarifications to substantive provisions and on procedural safeguard mechanisms. Overall, despite some significant changes, the investment rules in the recent US FTAs and model BIT do not undermine the fundamental core of investor-state provisions and these still resemble closely those in NAFTA Chapter 11.
This assertion is further illustrated by the fact that the United States has not considered necessary to amend existing BITs. Neither did it take advantage of the FTA negotiations with Bahrain to update its earlier BIT concluded in 1999. The previous generation of BITs is still considered an effective tool to protect US investments and a minor threat of over-litigation against the US government. It is even possible that the new FTAs will strengthen previous BITs. Claimants could use the language of the recently concluded US FTAs to argue that if BIT parties had meant what is said in these FTAs, they would have used the same language. Paradoxically, safeguards in the recent FTAs could support expansive interpretations of previous BITs. 123 Strong investment protection, including investor-state provisions, remains high on the US agenda, despite the fact that the United States has apparently become wary of such provisions in the case of major capital-exporting countries. Although they are not optimistic about the prospects for a WTO-sponsored investment agreement, US authorities would nevertheless insist on investorstate provisions in any such multilateral treaty.
124 Therefore, even if some substantive provisions may be further scaled back and more procedural safeguards be added, there is no evidence that the United States will do away with investor-state dispute settlement or even that it will accept that such provisions be significantly curtailed.
